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The Due Process Protections Act:
Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?
Allyson D. Benko*
On Wednesday, October 21, 2020, the President signed the Due Process
Protections Act into law, amending Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.
Specifically, the Act requires all federal judges in criminal proceedings to
issue an order that confirms the prosecutorial obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, the landmark case in which
the Supreme Court of the United States held that prosecutorial suppression
of material evidence favorable to the accused violated due process. The Act
also requires federal judges to state on the record the potential
consequences for attorneys violating such an order. Finally, the Act requires
each judicial council in which a district court is located to promulgate a
model order for its courts to use.1 According to its sponsors, the Act and the
resulting “Brady orders” are intended to “protect the right of the accused to
all evidence that could exonerate them and hold accountable prosecutors
who fail to comply.”2 However, the Act does not change prosecutors
already existing legal and ethical obligations for making Brady disclosures
to defense counsel.3 Rather, it now burdens federal courts to inform
prosecutors of those obligations in every case, along with the consequences

*J.D. Candidate, 2022, Saint Louis University School of Law
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); 166 CONG. REC. H4582-83 (daily ed. Sep. 21,
2020) (statement of Rep. Lee); Bill Announcement, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/bill-announcement-102120/.
2 Durbin-Sullivan Due Process Protections Act Signed Into Law, RIVERBENDER.COM (Oct. 23,
2020), https://www.riverbender.com/articles/details/durbinsullivan-due-processprotections-act-signed-into-law-45336.cfm.
3 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (ruling (1) the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused,
called exculpatory evidence, violates due process by creating an unfair trial for the
accused where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment; (2) the prosecutor has a
duty to anticipate what defenses might be presented in a case, and, regardless of whether
the defense requests discovery, the prosecutor has a constitutional duty to provide any
exculpatory evidence to the defense, and (3) providing exculpatory evidence to the
defense upholds the standards of justice and gives the public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system).
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of not meeting them,4 and further reduces the rulemaking powers granted
to the judiciary by the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.5
The Due Process Protections Act (S. 1380) was introduced by Senators Dick
Durbin (D-IL) and Dan Sullivan (R-AK) on May 8, 2019,6 but this was not
the first time Congress considered legislation on Brady violations. In 2012,
Congress considered similar legislation when Senator Lisa Murkowski (RAK) introduced the Fairness in Disclosure Act (S. 2197), which would have
amended Title 18 of the U.S. Code to include the prosecutor’s disclosure
obligations, as well as the timing of such disclosures. 7 That legislation
followed the exoneration of Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) in 2009,8 but it
never moved out of the Senate Judiciary Committee because the Advisory
Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure informed the
Judiciary Committee that it was already considering rules amendments
addressing prosecutorial disclosure obligations.9

Due Process Protections Act, Pub. L. No. 116–182, 134 Stat. 894 (2020).
How the Rulemaking Process Works, UNITED STATES COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemakingprocess-works (last visited Oct. 28, 2020).
6 Due Process Protections Act, S. 1380, 116th Cong. (2020) (as enacted, Oct. 21, 2020).
7 Fairness in Disclosure Act, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012) (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 15,
2012).
8 Editorial, Justice After Senator Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012, at A20; See generally In
re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (D.D.C. 2012), stay pending appeal denied,
840 F. Supp. 2d 370, 371 (D.D.C. 2012) (U.S. Senator Ted Stevens was found guilty on
seven counts of making false statements, but the verdict was set aside because the
prosecution did not turn over Brady evidence during the trial. Senator Stevens was
prosecuted for lying about gifts received as a Senator in the preceding year. After the jury
returned a guilty verdict, his lawyer moved for a mistrial due to allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, but the motion was denied. Despite the denial, before
sentencing, the DOJ conducted an investigation into all the discovery it had given to the
defendant during the case and decided that it had committed sufficient error in failing to
disclose exculpatory evidence to warrant moving to set aside the verdict and to dismiss
the indictment. The court granted the motion, and the prosecution of Senator Stevens
ended.)
9 Letter from David G. Campbell (Ari.), Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, & Raymond M. Kethledge (6th Cir.), Chairman of the Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules to Chairman, to Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary for the United States House of Representatives (May 28,
2020) (on file with the Dep’t of Justice).
4
5
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Since then, the Advisory Committee has taken several steps to increase the
effectiveness of federal judges in overseeing the government’s Brady
obligations. First, the Advisory Committee recommended that the Federal
Judicial Center (FJC) update its Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges –
which is issued to every federal trial judge in the United States – to include
“best practices” for dealing with Brady disclosure issues. The Chair of the
Advisory Committee worked with the FJC to develop comprehensive
updates to the Benchbook.10 As described in the 2013 edition:
[T]he Benchbook Committee developed a primer on Brady that addresses
such issues as the basic duty to disclose exculpatory information, the
elements of a Brady violation, and the timing of disclosures. New section
5.06 includes an extensive discussion of later Supreme Court and appellate
case law interpreting and applying Brady; links to the Department of
Justice’s disclosure policies and the [Federal Judicial] Center’s report to the
Advisory Committee in 2011 on Brady and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16; and a list of sample cases in which disclosure of Brady
material was required. 11
The Advisory Committee has also acted to improve the timing and content
of pretrial disclosures. For example, new Criminal Rule 16.1 went into effect
on December 1, 2019. It requires that, no later than fourteen days after
arraignment, the attorneys for the government and defense must confer and
try to agree on the timing and procedures for all pretrial disclosures. It
further provides that the parties may “ask the court to determine or modify
the time, place, manner, or other aspects of disclosure to facilitate
preparation for trial.” This rule alone will ensure that Brady disclosure
obligations are discussed early in every case.12
In the last few months, the Advisory Committee approved for publication
a proposed amendment to Rule 16 that increases the pretrial disclosure
requirements for expert witnesses. The public comment period will last six

Id.
Fogel, Jeremy D., Preface to FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES, at iii (6th ed. 2013); see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 5.06, at 173-82 (6th ed. 2013).
12 Campbell & Kethledge, supra note 9.
10
11
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months, and the Advisory Committee will consider all comments and
testimony when finalizing a rule amendment.13
Despite the many steps taken in the interests of justice, Senators Durbin and
Sullivan still introduced the Bill, and it was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee for action.14 Just over a year later, during the global pandemic
and a time of rampant public protest about unfairness in the criminal justice
system, the Judiciary Committee discharged the Bill unanimously on May
20, 2020.15 That same day, it also passed unanimously in the Senate and was
sent to the House, where it passed on September 21, 2020, before being
presented to the President for signature or veto.16
The Act has passed, now what?
First, there is nothing new as far as legal and ethical obligations under
Brady; those are still the same. However, the “order” may make disclosure
requirements a priority for prosecutors to avoid any negative consequences
of concealment.17 Prosecutors are already keenly aware of their discovery
obligations, and adequate sanctions already exist if prosecutors do not meet
their obligations under Brady.18 Sanctions include investigations by the
Office of Professional Responsibility, referral to state bar disciplinary
authorities, and unfavorable employment actions.19 In some situations prior
to the Due Process Protections Act being signed into law, courts have even
used civil contempt as a means to enforce compliance with discovery
orders.20 In that regard, the kind of notice required in the Due Process
Protections Act could provide courts with the opportunity to further hold
prosecutors in criminal contempt. Civil contempt "is ordinarily used to
compel compliance with a court order . . . . By contrast, criminal contempt
Id.
S. 1380, supra note 6.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Durbin-Sullivan Due Process Protections Act Signed Into Law, supra note 2.
18 Letter from Stephen Boyd, Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legislative
Affairs for the U.S. Department of Justice, to Russell Vought, Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (Sep. 28, 2020).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., In re Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1272-75
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
13
14

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

is used to punish; that is, to vindicate the authority of the court following a
transgression rather than to compel future compliance or to aid the
complainant."21 Does Congress intend to punish prosecutors for Brady
violations? If it does, what are the unintended second and third order
effects of doing so? Regardless of these effects, supporters of the Act would
argue it puts more “teeth” into the Brady obligations—an order on the
record will give federal judges the authority to hold prosecutors
accountable even if a case is dismissed as a mistrial or for any other reason.
Second, while not adding any new obligations to prosecutors, the
legislation does unnecessarily impose the burden of a new procedure on
district courts,22 which should have full authority to run the discovery
process in their courtrooms. Many district courts already issue their own
pre-trial criminal discovery orders detailing prosecutors' obligations under
Rule 16 and Brady.23 If a district court is concerned that a prosecutor
appearing in the courtroom may not understand his or her obligations, the
court has adequate existing tools to address the issue.24 That said, requiring
an order in all district courts in every criminal case seeks to ensure every
criminal defendant has a fair trial, even those defendants in districts that
did not issue pre-trial discovery orders prior to enactment of the Due
Process Protections Act.25
Third, Congress’s direct amendment of the Federal Rules acts to reduce the
judiciary’s rulemaking authority pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, which
empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe “general rules of practice and
procedure.” 26 The only caveat is that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.”27 The Supreme Court, through the
Judicial Conference of the United States, exercises its delegated
policymaking powers by engaging in a deliberative and transparent
process involving all criminal justice stakeholders.28 The Rules Enabling Act
Id. at 1274.
Due Process Protections Act, Pub. L. No. 116–182, 134 Stat. 894 (2020).
23 Boyd, supra note 18.
24 Id.
25 Press Release, Chairman Nadler Applauds House Passage of 10 Judiciary Bills (Sept.
22, 2020) (on file with U.S. Rep. Jerry Nadler).
26 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018) (effective as amended Dec. 1, 1990).
27 Id.
28 How the Rulemaking Process Works, supra note 5.
21
22
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authorizes amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only
after broad public participation and review by the bench, bar, academia,
and Congress. It has worked well for more than eighty years, ensuring a
thorough and inclusive process for evaluating important changes to
criminal procedure.29 However, every time Congress directly amends the
Federal Rules, the judiciary is deprived of its “opportunity to receive
testimony and written submissions” on the proposed change and citizens
of the United States are deprived of their opportunity to provide comments
on the rulemaking before it goes into effect.30
In conclusion, the Due Process Protections Act was a long time coming after
the exoneration of Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska. Now, only time will
tell if it really has an effect on the fairness or unfairness of criminal
prosecutions. While it does not change any ethical or legal obligations, it
may increase the priority with which prosecutors turn over Brady evidence.
While it imposes an added burden on federal judges and district courts, if
the equality of justice improves, the juice may be worth the squeeze. As for
Congress taking back or reducing delegated authority, it is well within the
limits of the United States Constitution to do so.

Edited by Ben Davisson
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Campbell & Kethledge, supra note 9.
Id.

